Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation

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Xin Chang, Kangkang Fu, Angie Low, Wenrui Zhang

2015 Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 115 Issue 1 Article Cited by 464 Quartile

Abstract

We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

Affiliations

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; INSEAD, Singapore; Department of Finance, Chinese University of Hong Kong, HongKong, Hong Kong

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