Sergei Glebkin, Bart Zhou Yueshen, Ji Shen
This paper studies simultaneous multilateral search (SMS) in over-the-counter markets: When searching, a customer simultaneously contacts several dealers and trades with the one offering the best quote. Higher search intensity (how often one can search) improves welfare, but higher search capacity (how many dealers one can contact) might be harmful. When the market is in distress, customers might inefficiently favor bilateral bargaining (BB) over SMS. Such a preference for BB speaks to the sluggish adoption of SMS trading, like request-for-quote protocols, in over-the-counter markets. Furthermore, a market-wide shift to SMS may not be socially optimal. © The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved.
INSEAD, France; INSEAD, Singapore, Singapore; Peking University, China
